The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Taking A Bite Out Of Bribery In International Business Transactions by Pacini, Carl
Fordham Journal of Corporate &
Financial Law
Volume 17, Number 2 2012 Article 5
The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Taking A
Bite Out Of Bribery In International Business
Transactions
Carl Pacini∗
∗
Copyright c©2012 by the authors. Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law is produced
by The Berkeley Electronic Press (bepress). http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/jcfl
The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Taking A
Bite Out Of Bribery In International Business
Transactions∗
Carl Pacini
Abstract
Enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”) has reached an all-time high.
FCPA violations can result in many significant costs, both monetary and non-monetary. FCPA
compliance has become a top corporate governance issue and has triggered shareholder litigation,
tax investigations, and money laundering probes. While many corporate managers, financial of-
ficers, board members, internal and external auditors, and forensic accountants are aware of the
FCPA’s basic objectives and mandates, many may not do an adequate job of protecting their firms
and/or clients from the dangerous consequences that can result from FCPA non-compliance. The
purposes of this paper are to: (1) analyze and describe bribery and FCPA case filings, sanctions,
payments (bribes), and value of business to be obtained; (2) describe and analyze the important
provisions of the FCPA; and (3) make recommendations to help firms improve their compliance
with the FCPA.
KEYWORDS: THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT
∗Associate Professor of Accounting, University of South Florida-St. Petersburg; Adjunct Profes-
sor of Forensic Accounting, Florida Atlantic University; J.D., University of Notre Dame, 1979;
Ph.D., Florida State University, 1997. The author acknowledges the hard work and dedication of
the editors and staff of the Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law.
VOLUME XVII 2012 NUMBER 2 
 
FORDHAM 
JOURNAL OF 
CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT: 
TAKING A BITE OUT OF BRIBERY IN 
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS 
 
Carl Pacini 
  545
THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT: 
TAKING A BITE OUT OF BRIBERY IN 
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS 
Carl Pacini* 
ABSTRACT 
Enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”) has 
reached an all-time high. FCPA violations can result in many 
significant costs, both monetary and non-monetary. FCPA 
compliance has become a top corporate governance issue and has 
triggered shareholder litigation, tax investigations, and money 
laundering probes. While many corporate managers, financial 
officers, board members, internal and external auditors, and forensic 
accountants are aware of the FCPA’s basic objectives and mandates, 
many may not do an adequate job of protecting their firms and/or 
clients from the dangerous consequences that can result from FCPA 
non-compliance. The purposes of this paper are to: (1) analyze and 
describe bribery and FCPA case filings, sanctions, payments 
(bribes), and value of business to be obtained; (2) describe and 
analyze the important provisions of the FCPA; and (3) make 
recommendations to help firms improve their compliance with the 
FCPA. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In February 2010, BAE Systems reached settlements with the U.S. 
Department of Justice (“DOJ”) and the United Kingdom Serious Fraud 
Office totaling $450 million.1 The settlements involved an alleged 
violation of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”)2 in connection 
                                                                                                                                         
 1. Steven Tyrell, DOJ Prosecution of BAE Heralds Continued Aggressive FCPA 
Enforcement Environment, WEIL GOTSHALL & MANGES LLP BRIEFING (Feb. 8, 2010), 
available at http://www.weil.com/news/pubdetail.aspx?pub=9725. 
 2. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(b), (d)(1), (g)-(h), 78dd-1, 78dd-2, 78dd-3, 
78ff (2006)), amended by Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Amendment of 1988, Pub. L. 
No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107, 1415 (1988) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 to 78dd-3, 
78ff (2006) and the International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998, Pub. 
L. No. 105-366, 112 Stat. 3302 (1998) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to 78dd-3 
(2006)). 
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with the sale of a radar system to Tanzania.3 In January 2010, the DOJ 
arrested 22 employees and executives of firms in the military products 
industry.4 They were indicted on charges of bribing government officials 
in an African country to obtain a presidential guard business.5 In April 
of 2010, Charles Jumet of Virginia was “sentenced to 87 months in 
prison for paying bribes to former Panamanian government officials to 
secure maritime contracts.”6 In May of 2011, “a jury convicted Lindsey 
Manufacturing Co., two of its executives, and a Mexican sales agent in a 
bribery case.”7 This marked the first time a company has been convicted 
at trial for violations of the FCPA.8 
In 2000, there was one FCPA case pursued by the federal 
government. In 2009, there were 67 cases filed by the DOJ and the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) (see Table 1). These 
facts highlight the growing priority given to FCPA enforcement by the 
DOJ and the SEC. The Assistant Attorney General Lanny A. Breuer, 
insists that aggressive prosecution of the FCPA “should make clear to 
every corporate executive, every board member, and every sales agent 
that [the DOJ] will seek to hold you personally accountable for FCPA 
violations.”9 “The increase in FCPA prosecutions over the past several 
years can be attributed to an increase in voluntary reporting by 
corporations . . . increased international law enforcement cooperation, . . 
. a renewed focus on internal controls, the Sarbanes-Oxley requirement 
                                                                                                                                         
 3. Press Release, BAE Sys., BAE Sys. PLC Announces Global Settlement with 
U.S. Dep’t of Justice and U.K. Serious Fraud Office, (Feb. 23, 2010), available at 
http://www.baesystems.com/Newsroom/NewsReleases/autoGen_1101517013.html. 
 4. Government Sting Snares 22 Individuals Employed by Military Equipment 
Suppliers, FOLEY AND LARDNER LLP (Jan. 2010), http://www.foley.com/publications 
/pub_detail.aspx?pubid=6752 [hereinafter Government Sting Snares]; Press Release, 
Dep’t of Justice, Twenty-Two Executives and Employees of Military and Law 
Enforcement Products Companies Charged in Foreign Bribery Scheme (Jan. 19, 2010). 
 5. Id. 
 6. Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Virginia Resident Sentenced to 87 Months in 
Prison for Bribing Foreign Gov’t Official, Office of Public Affairs (Apr. 19, 2010). 
 7. Samuel Rubenfeld, Conviction in Foreign Bribery Case is First in U.S. Trial, 
WALL ST. J., May 11, 2011, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142405 
2748703730804576315573205511018.html 
 8. Id. 
 9. George Terwilliger III et al., 2010: All Signs Point to a Record-Breaking Year 
for FCPA Enforcement, WHITE & CASE LLP (Mar. 1, 2010), http://www.whitecase 
.com/alerts-03022010/. 
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of executive certifications,” proactive law enforcement investigations, 
and the global anti-fraud climate.10 
U.S. firms competing for international business need to pay close 
attention to several trends. First, the number of FCPA cases and the 
severity of penalties will increase as the DOJ and SEC emphasize 
enforcement. Second, FCPA compliance will become a top corporate 
governance issue leading to more rigorous compliance. Third, 
international harmonization of antifraud and anticorruption regulation 
will lead to more parallel investigations and increased penalties. Fourth, 
“FCPA investigations may trigger other actions such as shareholder 
litigation, tax investigations, and money-laundering probes.”11 While 
many corporate managers, financial officers, general counsels, 
compliance officers, and internal and external auditors are aware of the 
FCPA, “companies could benefit considerably from both increasing 
their knowledge and awareness of the FCPA and improving their 
capabilities to mitigate the risk of bribery and corruption.”12 
This Article provides a close look at the requirements imposed on 
U.S. and some foreign firms by the FCPA in the context of the emerging 
trends noted above. The purposes of this article are to: (1) analyze and 
describe bribery and FCPA case filings, sanctions, payments (bribes), 
and value of business to be obtained; (2) describe and analyze the 
important provisions of the FCPA; (3) analyze vicarious liability under 
the FCPA; and (4) make recommendations to help firms improve their 
compliance with the FCPA. 
I. WHAT IS BRIBERY? 
A bribe is an illegal and/or unethical business transaction that 
involves “the offering, promising, or giving something in order to 
                                                                                                                                         
 10. Patrick Taylor, Strategic FCPA Compliance: The Role of Continuous 
Monitoring as a Proactive Control, CORP. FIN. REV., Sept./Oct. 2009, at 20, 21. 
 11. Christopher Sulavik, Corruption Crackdown: How the FCPA is changing the 
way the world does business, PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, 3 (July 2009), http://www. 
pwc.com/us/en/foreign-corrupt-practices-act/publications/assets/pwc-corruption-crack 
down-fcpa-2009.pdf. 
 12. Survey, Corruption or Compliance-Weighing the Costs-10th Global Fraud 
Survey, ERNST & YOUNG, 2 (2008), http://www2.eycom.ch/publications/items/fraud 
_report_10/ey_global_fraud_survey_10.pdf. 
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influence a public official in the execution of his/her official duties.”13 A 
key element that distinguishes unacceptable payments is the corruption 
of a relationship of trust.14 In the public sector, “a bribe is an inducement 
that influences a public official to perform his or her duties in a manner 
contrary to the course that might otherwise be adopted.”15 
One distinctive element of bribery is the quid pro quo—the sense 
that office is abused in exchange for the benefit conferred.16 Two types 
of benefits may be conferred upon bribe-givers: (1) “according-to-rule” 
and (2) “against-the-rule” benefits.17 “According-to-rule benefits confer 
something on the bribe-giver that the briber should have received under 
the rules; the bribe-taker acts in a manner that he or she should have 
done anyway.”18 According-to-rule benefits are “grease” or 
“facilitation” payments. “These payments consist of small payments to a 
                                                                                                                                         
 13. International business firms engage in bribery for three reasons. First, in certain 
countries, normal business transactions cannot be initiated or completed without paying 
bribes. The firm may justify such conduct on the grounds of business necessity and that 
it is merely doing what is the norm in the country. Second, although a firm may 
recognize bribery as morally wrong, it may engage in it because other firms do it. 
Third, firms in desperate need of business may resort to bribery to obtain it. See Rajib 
Sanyal, Determinants of Bribery in International Business: The Cultural and Economic 
Factors, 59 J. BUS. ETHICS 139 (2005). 
 14. SUSAN ROSE-ACKERMAN, CORRUPTION AND GOVERNMENT: CAUSES, 
CONSEQUENCES AND REFORM 42 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1999). 
 15. Wayne Hamra, Bribery in International Business Transactions and the OECD 
Convention: Benefits and Limitations, 35(4) BUS. ECON. 34 (2000). 
 16. Philip M. Nichols, Are Extraterritorial Restrictions on Bribery a Viable and 
Desirable International Policy Goal Under the Global Conditions of the Late Twentieth 
Century?: Increasing Global Security by Controlling Transnational Bribery, 20 MICH. 
J. INT’L. L. 451, 476 n.54 (1999). An example of the quid pro quo are the bribery 
activities of Siemens A.G., a German engineering firm. In late 2008 and early 2009, the 
firm settled bribery cases in the U.S. and Germany by paying penalties and fines of 
more than $1.6 billion. Siemens managers and sales staff used a bribery slush fund to 
gain favors from foreign officials on a global scale. Siemens paid $5 million in bribes to 
the son of Bangladesh’s prime minister and other senior officials to win a mobile phone 
contract. In Argentina, a Siemens’ subsidiary paid more than $40 million in bribes to 
obtain a $1 billion agreement to produce national identity cards. In Venezuela, Siemens 
paid $16 million to obtain urban rail lines. See Siri Schubert & T. Christian Miller, At 
Siemens, Where Bribery Was Just a Line Item, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21, 2008, at B1. 
 17. See Philip Oldenburg, Middlemen in Third World Corruption: Implication of 
an Indian Case, 39 WORLD POLITICS 508, 525 (1987); Nichols, supra note 16, at 460. 
 18. Carl Pacini et al., The Role of the OECD and EU Conventions in Combating 
Bribery of Foreign Public Officials, 37 J. BUS. ETHICS 385, 386 (2002); see also 
Nichols, supra note 16, at 460. 
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person to obtain a favor such as expediting an administrative process; 
obtaining a permit, license, or service; or avoiding an abuse of power.”19 
An against-the-rule benefit is more egregious and “is exemplified 
by the award of a contract to a party who should not have won the 
contract. The abuse of office here-usually occurring in exchange for 
large sums of money-involves the discretion of the public official. 
Bribes paid to secure this type of benefit are referred to as ‘kickbacks’ 
or ‘grand corruption.’”20 Political or grand corruption involves relatively 
large sums paid to alter policy formulation, legislation, and major 
contract awards, which are tailored to favor narrowly defined private 
interests. “When the payment involves relatively large sums of money 
given with the aim of enticing the official to commit an illegal act to the 
advantage of the person making the payment, ‘subornation’ occurs.”21 
“Subornation is a request for officials to ‘look the other way,’ not to do 
their jobs, to do the job more quickly, or even to knowingly break the 
law.”22 “The degree of abuse tends to rise with the rank of the official 
involved.”23 
A second distinctive element of bribery involves the institutional 
positions of bribe-payers and bribe recipients. Are they agents or 
                                                                                                                                         
 19.  Antonio Argandona, Corruption and Companies: The Use of Facilitating 
Payments, 60 J. BUS. ETHICS 251 (2005); Pacini et al., supra note 18. One school of 
thought maintains that small-scale grease payments may perpetuate and nurture the 
culture of bribery. Officials who expect to be—and are—paid relatively small bribes by 
large companies will come to expect such payments from everyone merely to do their 
official duties. See Alexander Zervos, Amending the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: 
Repealing the Exemption for “Routine Government Action” Payments, 25 PENN ST. 
INT’L L. REV. 251 (2006). According to the “broken windows” hypothesis, low level 
grease payments can spread to upper levels of government when corrupt officials are 
promoted and higher-level officials are emboldened to ask for larger, more destructive 
bribes. See Thomas Dunfee & David Hess, Getting from Salbu to the “Tipping Point”: 
The Role of Corporate Action Within a Portfolio of Anti-Corruption Strategies, 21 Nw. 
J. INT’L L. BUS. 471, 477 (2001). 
 20. See Carl Pacini, Hudson Rogers & Judyth Swingen, The OECD Convention on 
Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions: 
A New Tool To Promote Transparency in Financial Reporting, 15 ADVANCES IN INT’L 
ACCT. 121, 123 (2002); Nichols, supra note 16, 460-461  
 21. See Pacini, Rogers & Swingen, supra note 20.  
 22. P.R. CATEORA & J.L. GRAHAM, INTERNATIONAL MARKETING 137 (10th ed. 
1999). 
 23. See Susan Rose-Ackerman, The Political Economy of Corruption, in 
CORRUPTION AND THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 38 (K. Elliott ed., 1997); Pacini et al., supra 
note 18, at 387. 
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principals? Only payments made to agents can be classified as bribes.24 
The possibility of bribery arises from the divergent interests of agents 
and principals and from information asymmetry, which gives agents a 
great deal of discretionary power. “Opportunities for corruption depend 
on the size of rents in the control of public agents, the discretion they 
have in allocating them, and their lack of a sense of accountability to 
society.”25 Moreover, the trade of public goods illegally against payoffs 
creates a market for corruption at the risk of having to pay a penalty.26 
Bribery is a crime of calculation: public officials weigh the 
expected benefits from corrupt behavior against the punishment imposed 
by society if they get caught. The transaction costs of illegal exchanges 
are important for maintaining secrecy. As bribery arrangements confer 
no property rights, the bribe-giver may fail to provide the service as 
agreed, may provide low quality goods and/or services, or may charge 
inflated prices. Such contracts are risky because agents have no court of 
law to which they can resort to in the event of a dispute.27 Bribery is 
even more distortive than excessive taxes because bribery must be done 
in secret.28 
II. THE EXTENT OF BRIBERY 
Precise quantitative estimates of the dollar amount of bribery are 
impossible to obtain since neither bribe-givers nor bribe-takers disclose 
the extent of their activities. The World Bank Institute has estimated that 
the total amount of bribes paid per year may be $1 trillion.29 According 
to Ernst & Young’s 10th Global Fraud Survey, about 23% of almost 
1200 corporations across 33 nations admitted their organizations had 
been approached to pay a bribe to retain or obtain business during the 
                                                                                                                                         
 24. Susan Rose-Ackerman, Bribes, Patronage and Gift-Giving, in CORRUPTION 
AND GOVERNMENT: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES, AND REFORM 93 (S. Rose-Ackerman ed., 
1999). 
 25. Jean Cartier-Bresson, The Causes and Consequences of Corruption: Economic 
Analyses and Lessons Learnt, in NO LONGER BUSINESS AS USUAL 11, 12 (2000). 
 26. See id. 
 27. See, e.g., Alvaro Cuervo-Cazurra, Who Cares About Corruption?, 37 J. INT’L 
BUS. STUDIES 807, 808 (2006); Cartier-Bresson, supra note 25. 
 28. Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, Corruption, 108 Q. J. ECON. 599, 600 
(1993). 
 29. BBC News, One in 10 Families Pays Bribes, Dec. 9, 2004, http://news.bbc.co. 
uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/in_depth/4080995.stm. 
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prior two years.30 In the 2010 Report to the Nations on Occupational 
Fraud and Abuse, corruption schemes were found in one-third of fraud 
situations and represented a median loss of $250,000.31 
Another indication of the extent of the bribery problem is the 
number of bribery scandals reported by the press. Huang Guangyu, a 
Chinese business tycoon who founded Gome Electrical Appliances, was 
formally charged with bribery, insider trading, and illegal business 
dealings.32 Another Chinese investigation uncovered construction 
project-related bribery activities that occurred over an 18-month period 
from 2009 to 2011 involving around three billion Yuan in construction 
contracts.33 Former Prince George’s County executive Jack B. Johnson 
admitted in federal court that he accepted over $400,000 in bribes.34 
According to a RCMP search warrant, Adriano Furgiuele, a former 
“auditor at the Canada Revenue Agency received $150,000 from the 
president of a company shortly after it got a favourable tax ruling.”35 
Tay Ee Tiong, a seafood supplier in Singapore, pled guilty to twenty 
counts of bribery for paying almost $1 million in kickbacks to nineteen 
chefs at high-end Chinese restaurants.36 
                                                                                                                                         
 30. Sara Brandfon, Company Executives Risk Fines and Jail by Ignoring 
AntiBribery Laws, BUSINESS WIRE (May 15, 2008), available at http://www.business 
wire.com/news/home/20080515005983/en/Company-Executives-Risk-Fines-Jail-
Ignoring-Anti-Bribery. 
 31. 2010 Report to the Nations on Occupational Fraud and Abuse, ASS’N OF 
CERTIFIED FRAUD EXAM’RS, 4 (2010), available at http://www.acfe.com/uploaded 
Files/ACFE_Website/Content/documents/rttn-2010.pdf.  
 32. Saibal Dasgupta, Charges Framed Against One-Time Richest Man in China, 
TIMES OF INDIA, Feb. 17, 2010, available at http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes. 
com/2010-02-16/china/28129165_1_charge-sheet-richest-man-huang-guangyu. 
 33. Toh Han Shih, Vice-Minister Unveils 156000 Corruption Cases With 5698 
Offenders Punished, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST, May 18, 2011, at 6. 
 34. Ruben Castaneda & Miranda S. Spivack, Johnson, ex-county executive in 
Prince George’s, pleads guilty to taking bribes, WASH. POST, May 17, 2011, available 
at http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/johnson-ex-county-executive-in-prince-geor 
ges-pleads-guilty-to-taking-bribes/2011/05/17/AF0pP75G_story.html. 
 35. Daniel Leblanc, RCMP Alleges Ex-Auditor Received Payment, THE GLOBE 
AND MAIL (Canada), May 17, 2011, at A8. 
 36. Elena Chong, Seafood Supplier Admits Bribing Chefs, THE STRAITS TIMES 
(SING.), May 16, 2011, available at http://www.straitstimes.com/BreakingNews 
/Singapore/Story/STIStory_669245.html. 
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III. ANALYSIS OF AND TRENDS IN FCPA CASES 
Available data on FCPA cases filed by the SEC and the DOJ for the 
years 2000-2009 was extracted and analyzed. The analysis considers the 
number of cases filed by the SEC and the DOJ, cases disposed of and 
pending, cases against corporations and individuals, and cases against 
foreign corporations. This paper also assesses SEC and DOJ monetary 
sanctions, total and mean value of business obtained, total and mean 
amount of bribes (or payments), and ratio of bribes to value of business 
obtained. In numerous instances, insufficient or no data was available. 
The assessment of FCPA cases is outlined below and is based on the 
data in Table 1. 
One distinct trend is that SEC and DOJ enforcement efforts have 
become more aggressive. Table 1 indicates that 232 FCPA cases were 
initiated during the years 2000-2009. The number of FCPA cases filed 
annually escalated considerably after 2004. Over 80% of case filings in 
the decade ending in 2009 occurred during the years 2005-2009. In 
2005, 14 cases were initiated compared to 67 in 2009. Approximately 
64% of FCPA cases in the years 2000-2009 were initiated by the DOJ. 
Specifically, the majority of the cases filed contributing to this rise have 
involved DOJ criminal cases. In 2006, seven DOJ criminal cases were 
filed. In 2009, that number rose to 52. Moreover, slightly more than 
80% of FCPA cases have been resolved without going to trial. The SEC 
and DOJ today have between 70 and 80 FCPA investigations underway 
at any given time.37 The DOJ and SEC have shown an increased 
willingness to bring enforcement actions against individuals. In fact, 
Table 1 shows that, in sum, more cases have been brought against 
individuals than corporations during the years 2000-2009. In 2007 and 
2008, more FCPA cases were initiated against corporations than 
individuals. In 2009, however, almost three times as many cases were 
brought against individuals as compared to corporations (50 vs. 17). The 
SEC and DOJ are sending a clear message that individuals will be held 
liable for FCPA violations even when acting within the scope of their 
employment. 
A review of the enforcement of the OECD Convention on 
Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials (“OECD Anti-Bribery 
Convention”) by Transparency International shows that the U.S. is the 
                                                                                                                                         
 37. 2010 Year-End FCPA Update, GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP (Jan. 3, 
2011), http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Documents/2010YearEndFCPA 
Update.pdf.  
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most aggressive country in prosecuting bribery. Although enforcement 
by the other 37 member nations is improving, the U.S. accounted for 
41% of criminal case sanctions (including deferred prosecution 
agreements (DPAs) and non-prosecution agreements (NPAs)) from 
1999 to 2009 among all 38 parties to the OECD Anti-Bribery 
Convention.38 From 1999 to 2009, twenty-three OECD countries 
imposed no criminal sanctions on individuals or legal persons for 
foreign bribery.39 Despite increased FCPA enforcement, U.S. 
corporations continue to pay bribes out of business necessity because of 
the leniency of other countries.40 
Table 1 demonstrates a pattern of increasing monetary sanctions in 
both SEC and DOJ cases during the last decade. Both total and mean 
monetary sanctions have increased considerably. In 2004, total SEC 
monetary sanctions were $16.4 million. In 2007, SEC monetary 
sanctions exceeded $86 million. Total SEC monetary sanctions were 
over $200 million in 2008 and 2009. For 2008, the mean sanction was 
over $33 million. Moreover, total DOJ monetary sanctions climbed 
significantly throughout the last decade. In 2004, total DOJ monetary 
sanctions were just over $6 million. In 2008 and 2009, such sanctions 
exceeded $400 million. Mean monetary sanctions escalated from $3 
million in 2004 to over $30 million in 2008 and 2009. Total monetary 
sanctions have increased for two reasons. First, the rise in the number of 
FCPA cases has increased the total monetary sanctions collected by the 
government. Second, the size or amount of the fines levied has also 
escalated. 
Table 1 presents a summary of data on total and mean values of 
business obtained by bribers, the amount of bribes or payments, and the 
mean ratio of payments to business obtained in SEC cases. A lack of 
available data makes it virtually impossible to draw any conclusions 
about the value of business obtained for the years 2000-2004. However, 
in the second half of the last decade, a steady increase occurred in the 
total value and mean value of business obtained, except from 2008 to 
2009. This decline may be attributable to the severe global recession. 
                                                                                                                                         
 38. Working Group on Bribery Data on Enforcement of the Anti-Bribery 
Convention, OECD (2010), http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/11/15/45450341.pdf. 
 39. Id. 
 40. David Hess & Cristie L. Ford, Corporate Corruption and Reform 
Undertakings: A New Approach to an Old Problem, 41 CORNELL INT’L. L.J. 307, 313 
(2008). 
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Table 1 highlights an increase in the mean amount of bribes paid to 
foreign public officials since 2005. One cannot conclude, however, that 
more money is being spent on bribes to obtain or retain a dollar’s worth 
of business. One must consider the mean ratio of bribes paid to business 
obtained. Since 2005, this ratio has varied from 1.3% to over 27%. From 
2005 to 2009, the weighted average ratio of bribes paid to business 
obtained was about .1533. This means that, on average, bribe-givers 
spend just over $0.15 in bribes for each $1 in business obtained or 
retained in SEC cases. 
Table 1 also summarizes the total and mean values of business 
obtained by bribe-givers, the amount of bribes or payments, and the 
mean ratio of payments to business obtained in DOJ cases. Since 2005, 
the total value of business obtained rose from about $751 million to $6.5 
billion in 2009. A decrease occurred from $9.5 billion in 2008 to $6.5 
billion in 2009. This reflects a similar decline in the total value of 
business obtained in SEC cases. The mean value of business obtained 
increased from $37.3 million per case in 2005 to $225 million per case 
in 2009. The mean value of business obtained per case was lower in 
2009 than it was in 2007 and 2008, but still significantly higher than in 
2005. 
In 2005, the total amount of bribes paid increased exponentially 
compared to the early 2000s (except 2004). Total bribery payments then 
tailed off significantly in 2006 for DOJ cases. A look at total bribery 
payments for the years 2006-2009 shows both a substantial increase and 
great volatility. The same pattern exists for the mean amount of bribery 
payments in DOJ cases. 
An interesting statistic is the mean ratio of bribery payments to 
business obtained for DOJ cases. This ratio shows a relatively steady 
increase for the years 2004-2009. The weighted average ratio of bribes 
to the value of business obtained for 2000 to 2009 (excluding 2000 and 
2003 for lack of data) is .1390 for DOJ cases. This is slightly lower than 
the weighted average of .1533 for SEC cases. This means that bribe 
payers spend about $0.14 for each $1 in business obtained or retained in 
DOJ cases. 
Another clear trend in FCPA enforcement is increased cooperation 
between U.S. and foreign law enforcement authorities.41 The DOJ is 
working closely with its sister agencies, especially in Western Europe, 
                                                                                                                                         
 41. Taylor, supra note 10, at 20-25; Jeff Everett, D. Neu, & A. S. Rahman, 
Accounting and the Global Fight Against Corruption, 32 ACCT., ORGS., & SOC’Y. 513, 
526 (2007); Government Sting Snares, supra note 4.  
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“to share evidence and theories and obtain access to witnesses.”42 “The 
Norwegian energy company Statoil ASA became the subject of the first 
criminal FCPA enforcement action against a non-U.S. company over a 
plan to bribe an Iranian government official in exchange for oil and gas 
development contracts.”43 There have been other cases involving FCPA 
prosecution of foreign firms since Statoil ASA. Other cases include 
United States v. Vetco Gray Controls, Inc.,44 United States v. Technip 
S.A.,45 and United States v. Naaman.46 The trend towards increased 
global FCPA enforcement continues unabated with numerous actions 
against foreign companies, sending the message that businesses must 
stop engaging in bribery to obtain or retain business. “Among the 
developments that are anticipated are widespread multi-jurisdictional 
anti-bribery efforts with facilitated cross-border evidence gathering, 
asset seizures, speedy extradition, and increased scrutiny of American 
firms abroad, often without constitutional safeguards.”47 
                                                                                                                                         
 42. Mark Miller, Corruption Cases Go International, NAT’L. L. J., Mar. 26, 2007, 
at 1. 
 43. Michael Bixby, The Lion Awakens: The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act-1977 to 
2010, 12 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 89, 113 (2010). 
 44. United States v. Vetco Gray Controls, Inc., No. 4:07-CR-00004-001-003 (S.D. 
Tex. Feb. 17, 2007). 
 45. United States v. Technip S.A., No. 4:10-CR-00439 (S.D. Tex. June 28, 2010). 
Jean Fourcand, President, Fourcand Enterprises, Inc., pleaded guilty on Feb. 19, 2010 to 
engaging in monetary transactions involving property derived from a scheme to bribe 
former Haitian government officials to gain telecommunication contracts. The Haitian 
government provided substantial assistance in gathering evidence during the 
investigation. See Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Florida Businessman Pleads Guilty to 
Money Laundering in Foreign Bribery Scheme (Feb. 19, 2010). 
 46. United States v. Naaman, No. 08-246-(ESH) (D.D.C. Aug. 7, 2008). A 
Canadian /Lebanese citizen named Ousama M. Naaman pleaded guilty to participating 
in an eight-year conspiracy to defraud the U.N. Oil for Food Program and bribe Iraqi 
officials in connection with the sale of a chemical additive used in the refining of leaded 
fuel. He was arrested in Germany and extradited to the U.S. Investigative assistance 
was provided by the U.K.’s Serious Fraud Office. See Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, 
Innospec Agent Pleads Guilty to Bribing Iraqi Officials and Paying Kickbacks Under 
the Oil for Food Program (June 25, 2010). 
 47. Rollo C. Baker, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 47 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 647, 
678 (Spring 2010). 
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IV. ANALYSIS OF THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 
Two central themes are captured by the FCPA. The first is that no 
entity or person may offer or pay anything of value to the official of a 
foreign government or certain international organizations that would 
cause the official to misuse power or influence to benefit a business 
interest of any entity or person.48 The second is that if any payment is 
made to an official, whether the purpose is proper or corrupt, the 
payment must be reported in the payer’s financial statements according 
to generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP).49 
In 1998, Congress amended the FCPA anti-bribery provisions, 
implementing the OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign 
Public Officials in International Business Transactions.50 The 
amendments extended the jurisdictional reach of the anti-bribery 
provisions to U.S. persons or entities acting outside the U.S. and non-
U.S. persons acting within U.S. territory.51 The amendments also added 
the words “securing any improper advantage” as a prohibited purpose to 
the FCPA’s existing list, defined “foreign official” to include officials of 
public international organizations (e.g., the World Bank), and extended 
criminal penalties of the FCPA anti-bribery provisions to foreign 
employees and agents of U.S. entities.52 
                                                                                                                                         
 48. William Athanas, When Doing Business Internationally Becomes a Crime: 
Assisting Clients in Understanding and Complying with the Foreign Corrupt Practices 
Act, 71 ALA. LAW. 382, 383-384 (2010); Stuart Deming, The Potent and Broad-
Ranging Implications of the Accounting and Record-Keeping Provisions of the Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act, 96 J. CRIM. & CRIMINOLOGY 465, 467  (2006). 
 49. Id. 
 50. In November 1997, 34 nations signed the OECD Convention on Combating 
Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions. Signatory 
nations “have bound themselves to prevent bribery by multinational firms by 
criminalizing ‘active’ bribery of other nations’ officials, whether or not those countries 
are signatories to the OECD Convention. The 1997 convention distances itself from the 
traditional model of penal law conventions in that its norms are self-executing . . . . 
Some nations have enacted legislation with more lenient standards than others thereby 
putting the nations with stricter standards at a competitive disadvantage.” Pacini et al., 
supra note 18, at 390, 397. 
 51. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(g), 78dd-2(i), 78ff(c) (2006); Amy Dean Westbrook, 
Enthusiastic Enforcement, Informal Legislation: The Unruly Expansion of the Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act, 45 GA. L. REV. 489, 502 (2011); Baker, supra note 47, at 657-
58. 
 52. International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-
366, 112 Stat. 3302, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to -3 (2006). 
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In July 2010, President Obama signed into law the Dodd-Frank 
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act.53 Section 922 grants 
significant protections and rewards to individuals who voluntarily 
provide the SEC with original information relating to the violation of the 
FCPA (and other securities laws). Individuals (apart from certain 
ineligible persons such as law enforcement officers) who provide 
original information that leads to the assessment of monetary sanctions 
in excess of $1 million are entitled to receive between 10% and 30% of 
the sanction amount as a reward.54 No award will be made, however, to 
any whistleblower who gains the information through an audit of 
financial statements of a publicly traded firm.55 The law provides a 
private right of action in federal court for whistleblowers regardless of 
administrative delay.56 Dodd-Frank also increases the statute of 
limitations for whistleblower protection actions to six years following 
the alleged violation.57 
It is not yet certain that the new whistleblower provisions will 
increase the quality of reporting and improve fraud detection.58 In 
addition, the 10% floor on rewards might not be cost effective. “There is 
little evidence in the legislative history of Dodd-Frank that Congress 
contemplated whether the law’s costs might exceed the residual amount 
of fraud enforcement proceeds in the Investor Protection Fund once 
bounties are paid from the Fund.”59 Also, the reward or bounty program 
may lead to unnecessary litigation as the law entitles whistleblowers to 
appeal the amount of any award granted by the SEC.60 
A. ANTI-BRIBERY PROVISIONS 
The basic elements of any FCPA bribery violation are: (1) a private 
or publicly traded firm or any foreign person in the U.S.; (2) who 
                                                                                                                                         
 53. Mara V.J. Senn & Rachel L. Frankel, Wall Street Reform Law Creates 
Foreign-Payment Legal Hazards, OIL & GAS J., Sept. 6, 2010, at 24. 
 54. 15 U.S.C. §§ 922(a), 21F(b)(1) (2006). 
 55. Id. §§ 922(a), 21F(c)(2)(a). 
 56. Id §§ 922(a), 21F(h)(1)(B)(i). 
 57. Id. §§ 922(a), 21F(h)(1)(B)(iii)(aa). 
 58. Dave Ebersole, Note, Blowing the Whistle on the Dodd-Frank Whistleblower 
Provisions, 6 OHIO ST. ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 123, 127 (2011). 
 59. Id. at 142. 
 60. Id. at 143; Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, §§ 
922(a), 21F(f). 
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corruptly; (3) pays or offers to pay money or anything of value; (4) to a 
foreign official or a foreign political party or to any person while 
knowing that all or part of the payment will be offered or paid to a 
foreign official; (5) for the purpose of influencing the official to obtain, 
retain, or direct business to any person or to secure an improper 
advantage.61 All elements must be proven by credible evidence for the 
SEC and/or DOJ to prevail in a case. 
V. WHO IS COVERED BY THE ANTI-BRIBERY PROVISIONS? 
The anti-bribery provisions are broader than the accounting/internal 
control provisions of the FCPA. The former apply to “issuers,” 
“domestic concerns” and “foreign persons” acting within the U.S.62 An 
“issuer” is a public company subject to the registration or reporting 
requirements of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which includes 
firms using American Depositary Receipts (that are listed on an 
American exchange).63 A “domestic concern” is any business (including 
those privately or family owned) that has its principal place of business 
in the U.S. or is organized under the laws of the U.S., its states, 
territories or possessions.64 In addition, citizens, nationals, or residents 
of the U.S. are “domestic concerns.”65 Officers, directors, employees, 
agents and stockholders of foreign persons are also subject to the FCPA 
if they commit a violation while in the U.S. The FCPA provides that a 
foreign citizen, who is an agent of a domestic concern, is subject to the 
anti-bribery provisions even for acts committed outside the U.S.66 A 
recent FCPA enforcement action demonstrated the government’s 
willingness to prosecute U.S. companies and executives for business 
                                                                                                                                         
 61. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to -3 (2006). 
 62. The FCPA is intended to cover all foreign persons who commit any act in 
furtherance of a bribe while in the U.S. S. REP. NO. 105-277, at 3 (1998). 
 63. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a). 
 64. Id. § 78dd-2(h)(1)(B). 
 65. Id. § 78dd-2(h)(1)(A). Instances of an individual indicted as a “domestic 
concern” occurred in United States v. Ott, Crim. No. CR 07-608 (D.N.J. Jul. 25, 2007) 
and United States v. Steph, Crim. No. CR H07-307 (S.D. Tex. Jul. 19, 2007). 
 66. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2. In United States v. Bodmer, 342 F. Supp. 2d 176, 176, 
181-82 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), the district court dismissed an indictment against a Swiss 
citizen based on the wording of the FCPA before some 1998 amendments. The district 
court decision makes clear that the FCPA, as amended, applies to such individuals. See 
also United States v. DPC Tianjin, Ltd., No. 05-CR-282 (C.D. Cal. May 20, 2005). 
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activity occurring entirely abroad, despite domestic-based personnel’s 
lack of direct knowledge and participation.67 
Generally, the activities of a foreign subsidiary or joint venture of a 
U.S. corporation are not subject to the FCPA.68 The U.S. government 
“could have jurisdiction over acts (and those who authorize such acts) 
that occur outside the U.S. if such acts trigger or cause further acts to 
occur within the territory of the United States.”69 Moreover, a U.S. 
parent may be held liable for the foreign subsidiary’s acts if the 
relationship between the parent and affiliate is legally close.70 
Monitoring of all international business activity is vital to U.S.-based 
international business. 
Two possible means exist to reach foreign affiliates under the 
FCPA: (1) through the direct liability of either the affiliate or its officials 
or both; (2) holding either the parent, its officials or both, liable for the 
actions of the affiliate. As to the first means, the FCPA provides for 
direct liability of the foreign affiliate of a U.S. firm (or any officer, 
director, employee, agent or stockholder acting on the affiliate’s behalf) 
if the affiliate is publicly traded or causes an act in furtherance of the 
bribe to occur in a U.S. territory.71 In U.S. v. DPC Tianjin, Ltd.,72 for 
example, the DOJ treated a Chinese subsidiary as an agent of the U.S. 
parent for purposes of anti-bribery violations. DPC Tianjin paid about 
$1.6 million in “improper commissions,” over an 11-year period, to 
doctors and laboratory personnel of state-owned hospitals.73 The 
                                                                                                                                         
 67. Litigation Release, Exchange Act No. 21162 ¶¶ 66-69 (July 31, 2009) 
(announcing settlement against two executives for liability as “control persons” who 
failed to supervise employees who made illegal bribes to Brazilian customs officials 
and falsified accounts to conceal the bribes), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation 
/complaints/2009/comp21162.pdf. 
 68. See, e.g., Dooley v. United Technologies Corp., 803 F. Supp. 428, 439 (D.D.C. 
1992). 
 69. Carolyn Lindsey, More Than You Bargained For: Successor Liability Under 
the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 35 OHIO N.U.L. REV. 959, 962 (2009); DON 
ZARIN, DOING BUSINESS UNDER THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 4-29 (1st ed. 
1995). 
 70. See In re Schnitzer Industries, Inc., AAER No. 2493 (Oct. 16, 2006), available 
at http://fcpa.shearman.com/files/91b/91bf8f0a302071c4b846d8b92bd9c8a9.pdf?i=45 
26294. 
 71. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(a), 3(a) (2006). 
 72. United States v. DPC Tianjin, Ltd., No. CR 05-482, at 1 (C.D. Cal. May 20, 
2005). 
 73. Id. at 2-5. 
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commissions were approved by the general manager of DPC Tianjin and 
booked in that firm’s financial statements as “selling expenses.”74 DPC 
Tianjin routinely sent these financial statements to its parent’s 
headquarters in Los Angeles where they were included in consolidated 
financial statements. Acts that occurred in U.S. territory in furtherance 
of bribes included faxes, telephone calls and emails with the U.S. parent. 
The FCPA’s reach over agents of issuers requires merely the use of 
interstate commerce related to some act in furtherance of an improper 
payment. This is one of a few cases that demonstrates the ability of 
enforcement agencies to reach the activities of foreign affiliates despite 
their technical exclusion from the statute’s coverage. 
It is more common for a U.S. parent, venture, or personnel to be 
liable for the corrupt practices of foreign affiliates. One basis for parent 
company liability turns on whether or not the parent participated in the 
improper conduct. The FCPA itself provides for direct parent liability 
under these conditions or scenarios: (1) the commission of an act in 
furtherance of an improper payment by the parent; (2) the 
“authorization” by the parent of the affiliate’s action; or (3) a direct 
offer, promise or transfer of value by the parent.75 The parent is not 
liable absent knowledge of the corrupt purpose of the payment.76 
Given the broad definition of “knowledge” accepted by the courts, 
criminal liability may be based on parent acquiescence (which is less 
than direct knowledge) in an affiliate’s corrupt payments. “A critical 
issue for parent companies facing FCPA liability will be the extent to 
which suspicious payments made by a subsidiary were documented and 
discussed with the parent.”77 If the books and records of the affiliate 
accurately reflect the use of assets to make bribery payments to foreign 
officials, then the parent has notice of corrupt behavior.78 If the parent 
takes no action then it may be deemed to have constructive knowledge 
of the payments.79 
                                                                                                                                         
 74. Id. at 5. 
 75. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(a), 2(a) (2006). 
 76. Id. §§ 78dd-2(h)(3)(A). 
 77. See Justin F. Marceau, A Little Less Conversation, A Little More Action: 
Evaluating and Forecasting the Trend of More Frequent and Severe Prosecutions 
Under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 12 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 285, 298 
(2007). 
 78. See H. Lowell Brown, Parent-Subsidiary Liability Under the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act, 50 BAYLOR L. REV. 1, 28 (1998). 
 79. Id. 
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VI. WHEN IS A PAYMENT MADE “CORRUPTLY?” 
The FCPA renders it illegal to make a payment “corruptly” to a 
foreign official or to “corruptly” commit any act within the U.S. in 
pursuit of prohibited conduct. The statute itself does not define the term 
“corruptly.” The lack of a statutory definition presents problems for 
corporate counsel, corporate executives, board members, and regulators. 
The legislative history of the FCPA provides some guidance. 
The statute’s legislative history indicates Congress’ intent: 
[T]he word ‘corruptly’ is used in order to make clear that the offer, 
payment, promise or gift must be intended to induce the recipient to 
misuse his official position in order to wrongfully direct business to 
the payer . . . or to obtain preferential legislation or a favorable 
regulation. The word ‘corruptly’ connotes an evil motive or purpose, 
an intent to wrongfully influence the recipients.80 
Case law also yields insight into the meaning of “corruptly.” One 
leading case that analyzes the meaning of “corruptly” under the FCPA is 
United States v. Liebo.81 The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the 
trial court’s jury instruction regarding the meaning of “corruptly”:  
[T]he offer, promise to pay, payment, or authorization of payment, 
must be intended to induce the recipient to misuse his official 
position or to influence someone to do so and that an act is 
“corruptly” done if done voluntarily and intentionally, and with a 
bad purpose of accomplishing either an unlawful end or result, or 
lawful end or result by some unlawful method or means.82  
A defendant need not be aware of the actual statutory provision nor 
know of the FCPA’s existence to be found guilty of an anti-bribery 
violation.83 The statute does require either the intent to influence an 
                                                                                                                                         
 80. H.R. REP. NO. 95-640, at 8 (1977); S. REP. NO. 95-114, at 10 (1977). 
 81. 923 F.2d 1308, 1312 (8th Cir. 1991). The federal appellate court found that a 
jury could infer corrupt intent where the evidence showed: (i) a close temporal link 
between the gift of airline tickets and the approval of a contract; (ii) a close relationship 
between the recipient of the gift and influential government officials; and (iii) a 
classification of the gift by the giver as a commission in company records. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. United States v. Kay, 513 F.3d 432, 448 (5th Cir. 2007). In this case, the 
federal government charged two executives of a Texas rice exporter with bribing 
Haitian customs officials to reduce customs duties. The defendants argued that bribes 
paid for tax avoidance fell outside the ambit of the FCPA because the customs officers 
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official act or a quid pro quo element.84 The bribe or illegal gratuity 
must be linked to a specific government action or meet the requirement 
that some particular official act be identified and proved.85 
VII. ANYTHING OF VALUE 
Although the FCPA does not define the term “anything of value,” 
the law prohibits not only consummated bribes but also unaccepted 
offers of bribes. Recent enforcement actions indicate that there are 
virtually no limitations on what can be considered “anything of value.” 
In the enforcement action against Kellogg, Brown and Root LLC and 
various other Halliburton Company affiliates, “things of value” provided 
to Nigerian officials included cash-stuffed briefcases and/or cash-loaded 
vehicles left in hotel parking lots.86 In contrast to this case, a FCPA 
action against UTStarcom, Inc. involved providing executive training 
programs at U.S. universities to Chinese officials even though the 
programs “were not specifically related to [the company’s] products or 
business.”87 The payment or offer of payment of “anything of value” 
includes employment of officials as consultants, expense paid travel, 
loans with favorable interest rates and repayment terms, golf outings, 
sports equipment, transportation of household goods, discounts and 
college scholarships.88 Courts often consider whether the defendant 
subjectively attached value to the item in question.89 
                                                                                                                                         
were not involved in facilitating the defendants’ business contracts. Although this 
argument prevailed at the district court level, the Fifth Circuit reversed on appeal 
holding that the statute’s legislative history indicates Congress intended to find a 
violation when a bribe improved business opportunities. Id. at 749-50. The Kay 
decision, however, does not address payments made in connection with an expectation 
of business. Furthermore, the Court’s opinion does not address instances where there is 
a substantial temporal gap between the payment and the foreign official’s act; see also 
Allen R. Brooks, Comment, A Corporate Catch-22: How Deferred and Non-
Prosecution Agreements Impede the Full Development of the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act, 7 J. L. ECON. & POL’Y. 137, 146 (2010). 
 84. See United States v. Quinn, 359 F. 3d 666, 673 (4th Cir. 2004). 
 85. United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers of California, 526 U.S. 398, 406 
(1999). 
 86. United States v. Kellogg Brown & Root LLC, No. H-09-071 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 6, 
2009). 
 87. SEC v. UTStarcom, Inc., No. CV 09-6094, at 1 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 31, 2009). 
 88. United States. v. Sawyer, 85 F.3d 713, 721 (1st Cir. 1996); United States v. 
Foley, 73 F.3d 484, 486 (2nd Cir. 1996); United States v. Liebo, 923 F.2d 1308, 1309-
10 (8th Cir. 1991); United States v. Hare, 618 F.2d 1085, 1086 (4th Cir. 1980); United 
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VIII. WHO IS A “FOREIGN OFFICIAL?” 
The FCPA broadly defines a “foreign official” as: 
 
[A]ny officer or employee of a foreign government or any 
department, agency, or instrumentality thereof, or of a public 
international organization or any person acting in an official capacity 
for or on behalf of any such government or department, agency, or 
instrumentality.90 
 
The OECD Convention defines a “foreign public official” as any 
person in a foreign country who holds a legislative, administrative, or 
judicial office, or who exercises a public function, including a public 
agency or enterprise. The term also covers officials of public 
international organizations.91 
Under the FCPA, “a foreign official is anyone who acts in an 
official capacity for a foreign government and who exercises some 
discretionary authority,” which includes “an officer of a foreign 
government” and even “an officer in its armed forces.”92 The term also 
covers any person acting in an official capacity for or on behalf of a 
state-owned enterprise or business.93 
The FCPA does not provide guidance concerning what types of 
entities are “instrumentalities” of a foreign government such that their 
employees are “foreign officials.”94 It remains unclear what level of 
government ownership or control will make a business an “agency or 
instrumentality” of the state. Despite the lack of guidance, the DOJ and 
                                                                                                                                         
States v. McDade, 827 F. Supp. 1153, 1161 (E.D. Pa. 1983), aff’d in part, 28 F.3d 283 
(3rd Cir. 1994). 
 89. See Rollo C. Baker, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 47 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 647, 
658-59 (2010). 
 90. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(h)(2)(A) (2006). 
 91. See supra text accompanying note 50. 
 92. Robert A. Youngberg, A Guide to the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 18 UTAH 
B.J. 22, 23 (2005). 
 93. See Roger M. Witten et al., Prescription for Compliance with the Foreign 
Corrupt Practices Act: Identifying Bribery Risks and Implementing Anti-Bribery 
Controls in Pharmaceutical and Life Sciences Companies, 64 BUS. LAW. 691, 697 
(2009). 
 94. Joel M. Cohen et al., Under the FCPA, Who Is a Foreign Official Anyway? 63 
BUS. LAW. 1243 (2008). 
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SEC broadly interpret the definition of “foreign official” in application 
to state-owned enterprises.95 
One of the most aggressive agency interpretations of “foreign 
official” in the context of a state-owned enterprise occurred in the 
KBR/Halliburton case.96 The SEC and DOJ claimed that officers and 
employees of Nigeria LNG Limited (“NLNG”) were “foreign officials” 
even though NLNG was 51% owned by multinational oil companies and 
49% owned by Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC).97 The 
enforcement agencies claimed that effective control of NLNG belonged 
to NNPC.98 The DOJ has indicated that the totality of the circumstances 
must be analyzed, including “the precise percentage of government 
ownership, whether the government has veto power of shareholder 
decisions, and the extent to which the government participates in day-to-
day administration of the entity.”99 
The DOJ and SEC interpretation(s) of “foreign official” have yet to 
be tested in a federal appellate court. The significance of such a test is 
growing since the agency interpretation has become central to many 
enforcement actions in recent years.100 Indeed, a clear federal appellate 
court interpretation would reduce uncertainty for business, although the 
high settlement rate for FCPA cases nevertheless evidences a reluctance 
on the part of U.S. businesses to litigate such difficult issues. 
The need for a clear court interpretation increases as business 
ownership arrangements evolve on a global scale. For example, 
government efforts around the globe to stimulate economies may have 
created a new type of foreign official. Government ownership has 
                                                                                                                                         
 95. Mike Koehler, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in the Ultimate Year of Its 
Decade of Resurgence, 43 IND. L. REV. 389 (2010). 
 96. Bass, Berry & Sims LLP, Halliburton and KBR Bring FCPA Settlement Total 
to Over $1.3 Billion in the Last 60 Days Alone, ANTITRUST & TRADE PRACTICES ALERT, 
Feb. 12, 2009. In February 2009, Kellogg Brown & Root (KBR), a former subsidiary of 
Halliburton, agreed to pay the DOJ “a fine of $402 million to settle FCPA charges 
related to the payment of about $180 million to foreign officials in Nigeria from 1994 to 
2004.” Nigerian officials awarded KBR four contracts worth $6 billion to build natural 
gas facilities. See Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Kellogg Brown & Root LLC Pleads 
Guilty to Foreign Bribery Charges and Agrees to Pay $402 Million Criminal Fine (Feb. 
12, 2009), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/pr/press_releases/2009/02/02-11-
09Kellogg-guilty.pdf. 
 97. Id.; United States v. Kellogg Brown & Root LLC, No. H-09-071 (S.D. Tex. 
Feb. 6, 2009). 
 98. Bass, Berry & Sims LLP, supra note 96. 
 99. Witten et al., supra note 93, at 697. 
 100. Koehler, supra note 95, at 410-12. 
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increased substantially in many economies. Financial institutions, 
sovereign wealth funds and other organizations involve heavy 
government ownership positions.101 Are employees of these firms 
“foreign officials” under the FCPA? 
IX. THE KNOWLEDGE REQUIREMENT 
The FCPA criminalizes both direct bribes and payments to 
intermediaries for the purpose of bribing foreign officials. While 
proving that a FCPA defendant knew or had knowledge that a payment 
to a foreign official was unlawful is often not an issue in direct bribery 
cases, it often becomes a contentious point in cases involving third party 
agents. In such cases, the FCPA outlaws payments to any person “while 
‘knowing’ that all or a portion of such money or thing of value will be 
offered, given, or promised, to any foreign official for a purpose 
prohibited by the FCPA.”102 
The FCPA itself provides that a person has knowledge or is 
“knowing” when (1) “such person is aware that such person is engaging 
in such conduct, that such circumstance exists, or that such result is 
substantially certain to occur,” or (2) “such person has a firm belief that 
such circumstance exists or that such result is substantially certain to 
occur.”103 The statute defines conscious avoidance as “knowledge of the 
existence of a particular circumstance,” established by being “aware of a 
high probability of the existence of such circumstance, unless the person 
actually believes that such circumstance does not exist.”104 
Clearly, the statutory definition of “knowing” is much broader than 
just actual knowledge. Until recently, the SEC and DOJ believed that 
the knowledge requirement could be met by a showing that a FCPA 
                                                                                                                                         
 101. Id. at 414. Westbrook, supra note 51, at 535-536. For example, the Royal Bank 
of Scotland is 68.4% owned by the U.K. government. BNP Paribas is partially owned 
by the government of France. Sovereign wealth funds make large cross-border 
investments in various firms and are sometimes directly owned by their home country 
governments (e.g., The China Investment Corporation). 
 102.  Kenneth Winer & Gregory Husisian, Recent Opinion Sheds Light on the 
Relevance of Due Diligence to the FCPA’s Knowledge Requirement, 4 CORP. 
ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT 2, Nov. 13, 2009 (emphasis added), available at 
http://www.foley.com/files/Publication/c03363c0-d03a-46e7-9015-c857d46e82fa 
/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/64e3d2de-9003-4ab0-b224-c8b5bfad536b 
/CorporateAccount2009.pdf. 
 103. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(h)(3)(A) (2006). 
 104. Id. § 78dd-2(h)(3)(B). 
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defendant had failed to perform adequate due diligence (with regard to 
red flags that a third party could possibly make improper payments). 
Such a “knowing” standard is intended to capture business managers or 
owners who fail to take action when red flags of a FCPA violation arise. 
In United States v. Kozeny,105 a federal district court ruled that this 
was an incorrect interpretation of the “knowledge” requirement. Bourke, 
a designer of handbags, had invested $8 million in a business venture 
(formed by Czech expatriate Victor Kozeny) that contemplated 
purchasing an Azerbaijani oil company.106 Kozeny purportedly paid 
bribes to Azerbaijani government officials in a failed effort to buy the 
state-owned oil company.107 A jury convicted Bourke of conspiring to 
violate the anti-bribery provisions.108 In a court brief, the government 
argued that Bourke’s failure to conduct adequate due diligence, plus 
awareness of a high probability that there were bribes, satisfied the 
knowledge requirement.109 Nevertheless, the district court found that the 
knowledge requirement cannot be met merely by a failure to perform 
adequate due diligence.110 Bourke could be found to have knowledge 
only because he took affirmative steps to avoid knowledge, and he 
possessed awareness of a high probability that there were bribes.111 
The Second Circuit opinion in United States v. Jacobs112 and the 
legislative history of the 1988 amendments to the FCPA113 support the 
Kozeny court’s analysis of the knowledge requirement. The Kozeny 
decision rejected the efforts of the DOJ and SEC to return the FCPA to 
the more lax standard of “reason to know” that prevailed before the 
1988 amendments to the FCPA.114 Mere negligence in not performing 
due diligence does not satisfy the FCPA knowledge requirement. 
                                                                                                                                         
 105. United States v. Kozeny, 664 F. Supp. 2d 369, 374 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
 106. Winer & Husisian, supra note 102, at 2. 
 107. Kozeny, 664 F. Supp. 2d at 374-77. 
 108. Id. at 371. 
 109. Winer & Husisian, supra note 102, at 2. 
 110. See Kozeny, 664 F. Supp. 2d at 385-88. 
 111. Id. at 374, 385-89. 
 112. United States v. Jacobs, 475 F.2d 270, 287 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied sub. 
nom., Lavelle v. United States, 414 U.S. 821 (1973). In Jacobs, the government alleged 
that the defendants had knowingly dealt in stolen securities. 475 F.2d at 273-74. The 
court noted the important distinction between recklessness and willful blindness. Id. at 
287. Reckless disregard by itself is not enough to satisfy the knowledge requirement. 
Id. 
 113. H.R. REP. NO. 100-576, at 919-20 (1988) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1988 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1547, 1952. 
 114. Winer & Husisian, supra note 102, at 4, 5, 7. 
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X. INFLUENCING AN OFFICIAL TO OBTAIN OR RETAIN BUSINESS 
OR SECURE AN IMPROPER ADVANTAGE 
The fifth element of the anti-bribery provision—also called the 
business nexus requirement—requires that a FCPA violator must take 
some action to influence a foreign official to “obtain or retain . . . , to 
direct business to any person, or to obtain an improper advantage.”115 
Congress did not define these terms, but limited judicial guidance 
supports a broad interpretation. “Business” is not limited to foreign 
government contracts but includes any commercial activity.116 In U.S. v. 
Kay,117 the issue before the court concerned whether payments to 
Haitian officials for lowering customs duties and sales taxes satisfied the 
business nexus requirement. In its decision, the Fifth Circuit Court of 
Appeals considered the FCPA’s legislative history, deeming the words 
“obtain or retain business” to be ambiguous.118 Although the court held 
that making payments to foreign officials to lower customs duties and 
taxes could provide an unfair advantage and assist the payer in obtaining 
or retaining business,119 such payments do not automatically satisfy the 
business nexus element of the FCPA.120 The Fifth Circuit noted that the 
FCPA’s legislative history shows that Congress intended to extend 
liability to situations where bribes improved business opportunities (in 
addition to allowing an entity to obtain or retain business).121 The Kay 
decision broadened the scope of the business nexus element to cover 
payments made to gain a comparative advantage or improve business 
opportunity (or obtain an improper advantage).122 
Indeed, the SEC and DOJ continue to interpret the fifth element 
broadly to include payments intended to influence governmental 
decisions having a positive impact on a defendant’s business. For 
                                                                                                                                         
 115. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2 (2006). 
 116. Youngberg, supra note 92, at 24. 
 117. United States v. Kay, 359 F.3d 738 (5th Cir. 2004). 
 118. Id. at 743-44. 
 119. Id. at 755-56. 
 120. Id. at 741. 
 121. Id. at 749-50. 
 122. See Juscelino F. Colares, The Evolving Domestic and International Law 
Against Foreign Corruption: Some New and Old Dilemmas Facing the International 
Lawyer, 5 WASH. U. GLOB. STUD. L. REV. 1, 13-14 (2006). 
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example, in U.S. v. Vetco Gray Controls, Inc.,123 various subsidiaries of 
Vetco Gray paid a $26 million fine for paying bribes to customs officials 
in Nigeria to obtain preferential treatment in the customs clearance 
process and in the importation of equipment. The charges did not 
specifically allege that the payments were made to “obtain or retain 
business.”124 Nevertheless, Vetco Gray did not contest the government’s 
interpretation of the phrase.125 
A. EXCEPTIONS AND LIMITATIONS 
1. Facilitating or Expediting Payments 
Congress created a “facilitating payments” exception to the FCPA 
in recognition of the fact that small “grease” payments are “a cost of 
doing business” in many countries.126 The exception was created in 1988 
when corporations complained that international business with the 
United States would suffer substantially without these payments.127 The 
FCPA’s legislative history includes a four-factor test to help distinguish 
between facilitating payments and illegal payments for “obtaining or 
retaining business.”128 With regard to payment purpose, Congress sought 
to criminalize: (1) payments intended to alter discretionary decision-
making so as to increase the payer’s business; (2) payments that are 
unusually large in relation to the government action done; (3) payments 
that directly affect competition in contracts; and (4) payments in 
exchange for services to which the bribe-giver is not entitled.129 Various 
courts that have considered the “facilitating payments” exception have 
                                                                                                                                         
 123. Plea Agreement at 16, United States v. Vetco Gray Controls, Inc., No. 07-CR-
0004 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 6, 2007), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud 
/fcpa/cases/vetco-controls.html. 
 124. Id. at 36. 
 125. See Plea Agreement, supra note 123, at 33-55. 
 126. Rebecca Koch, Note, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: It’s Time to Cut Back 
the Grease and Add Some Guidance, 28 B.C. INT’L. & COMP. L. REV. 379, 383-85 
(2005); Bixby, supra note 43, at 110-11. 
 127. H.R. REP. NO. 100-576, at 916 (1988). 
 128. Id. at 921, 1547, 1954. 
 129. H.R. REP. NO. 100-40, at 77 (1987); Charles B. Weinograd, Clarifying Grease: 
Mitigating the Threat of Overdeterrence by Defining the Scope of the Routine 
Governmental Action Exception, 50 VA. J. INT’L. L. 509, 518-519 (2010). 
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noted the importance of these four factors; and the test was actually 
adopted in U.S. v. Kay.130 
Moreover, SEC administrative proceedings provide some insight 
into how that agency evaluates this exception. The SEC’s treatment of 
the “facilitating payments” exception provides guidance for 
understanding its application within organizations covered by the 
antibribery provisions. SEC publications emphasize the significance of 
two factors: “the discrectionary nature of the acts performed and the 
degree to which the payor was entitled to the benefits of the payee’s 
performance.”131 In 2004, for example, BJ Services Company entered 
into a settlement agreement with the SEC concerning several alleged 
bribes, including a $10,000 payment to a representative of Argentina’s 
Secretary of Industry and Commerce.132 BJ Services paid the official to 
hasten the importation of business equipment held up for delivery.133 A 
payment made to expedite the customs process is an example of a 
facilitating payment and is permissible under the FCPA.134 Although the 
SEC did not expressly state that the payment fell within the FCPA 
exception, the SEC’s separate treatment of the payment shows the 
agency considered it distinguishable.135 
The FCPA indicates that payments to expedite the following 
routine governmental actions are deemed “facilitating payments”:  
(i)  obtaining permits, licenses, or other official documents to 
qualify a person to do business in a foreign country; 
(ii) processing governmental papers, such as visas and work 
orders; 
(iii) providing police protection, mail pickup and delivery, or 
scheduling inspections associated with contract 
performance or inspections related to transit of goods 
across country; 
                                                                                                                                         
 130. United States v. Kay, 359 F.3d 738, 749 (5th Cir. 2004); Weinograd, supra note 
129, at 525. 
 131. Weinograd, supra note 129, at 521. 
 132. In re BJ Servs. Co., Securities Exchange Act Release No. 49-390 (Mar. 10, 
2004), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/34-49390.htm. 
 133. Id. 
 134. Weinograd, supra note 129, at 522-23. 
 135. Id. 
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(iv) providing phone service, power and water supply, loading 
and unloading cargo, or protecting perishable products or 
commodities from deterioration . . . .136 
The FCPA contains no cap on the amount of a “facilitating 
payment,” but in practice those permitted have been under U.S. 
$1000.137 Moreover, it is imperative that any “facilitating payment” be 
accurately recorded on the payer’s books.138 Great care must be 
exercised in making “facilitating payments” given the amorphous nature 
of the exception.139 
XI. AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES 
One affirmative defense is if a payment is “lawful under the written 
laws and regulations” of the foreign official’s country.140 Notably, 
“lawful under written law” is different from being consistent with local 
custom and practice.141 Likewise, the defense is also not activated by the 
lack of or non-existence of written laws in the foreign official’s 
country.142 In United States v. Kozeny, Frederic Bourke attempted to 
invoke this defense by contending that payments made to Azeri officials 
were lawful under the laws of Azerbaijan because they were self-
reported and no Azeri prosecution would ensue.143 The claim that failure 
to prosecute bribery is tacit approval of such activity was dismissed by 
the trial court.144 No country in the world—even those with the most 
pervasive cultures of corruption—authorizes bribes under its written 
laws.145 
                                                                                                                                         
 136. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(f)(3)(A), -2(h)(4)(A) (2006). 
 137. Marika Maris & Erika Singer, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 46 AM. CRIM. L. 
REV. 575, 587 (2006). 
 138. Youngberg, supra note 92, at 25. 
 139. One source of trouble for businesses is the meaning of the word “routine.” A 
U.S. business can interpret the word to mean “frequently,” or “ordinary” or 
“commonplace.” Although the FCPA sets forth examples of “routine” governmental 
actions, the statute provides sparse guidance when questionable situations arise that are 
not listed in the law. Koch, supra note 126, at 389-90. 
 140. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(c)(1). 
 141. Athanas, supra note 48, at 385. 
 142. Lauren Giudice, Note, Regulating Corruption: Analyzing Uncertainty in 
Current Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Enforcement, 91 B.U. L. REV. 347, 357 (2011). 
 143. United States v. Kozeny, 582 F. Supp. 2d 535, 537 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). 
 144. Id. at 539. 
 145. Athanas, supra note 48, at 385. 
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A second affirmative defense is available for “reasonable and bona 
fide expenditures, such as travel and lodging expenses, incurred by or on 
behalf of a foreign official” that are directly related to “(A) the 
promotion, demonstration, or explanation of products or services; or (B) 
the execution or performance of a contract with a foreign 
government.”146 The government strictly construes this defense, 
knowing that firms will use it as a means of hiding excessive payments 
under the guise of reasonable promotional expenses.147 In U.S. v. 
Metcalf & Eddy, Inc.,148 the DOJ found that expenses were excessive. 
An engineering firm submitted a bid for work on an Egyptian 
infrastructure project. On two occasions, the engineering firm paid for 
first-class airfare from Egypt and luxury hotel accommodations for an 
Egyptian official, his wife and children. 
Affirmative defenses are just that; they are not exceptions. A party 
charged with a FCPA violation must prove that the payments satisfy the 
affirmative defense. 
A. LACK OF A PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION 
The FCPA itself has no private right of action. Further, case law 
has held that no private right of action is implied by the FCPA statute.149 
FCPA enforcement actions, however, have given rise to FCPA-derived 
lawsuits by plaintiffs, including shareholders, other governments and 
business partners. In In re Immucor Inc. Securities Litigation,150 
shareholder-plaintiffs brought a §10(b) lawsuit after Immucor’s stock 
price fell upon the initiation of a FCPA investigation by the SEC. 
                                                                                                                                         
 146. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(c)(2) (2006). 
 147. Brooks, supra note 83, at 146-47; Baker, supra note 47, at 663-64; Maris & 
Singer, supra note 137, at 588-89; Arthur Aronoff, Foreign Corrupt Practice Act Anti-
Bribery Provisions, in CORPORATE COMPLIANCE 503, 509, 512-13 (PLI Corp. L. & 
Practice Course Handbook Series No. 943, 1997). 
 148. United States v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., No. 1: 99CV12566 (D. Mass. Dec. 14, 
1999); Jones Day, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Walking the Fine Line of 
Compliance in China, 5 (Sept. 2008), available at http://www.jonesday.com/the-
foreign-corrupt-practices-act-walking-the-fine-line-of-compliance-in-china-09-26-
2008/.  
 149. Lamb v. Philip Morris, Inc., 915 F.2d 1024 (6th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 
U.S. 1086 (1991). 
 150. In re Immucor Inc. Secs Litigation, No. 1:05-CV-2276-(WSD), 2006 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 72335 (N.D. Ga. Oct. 4, 2006). 
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Immucor agreed to settle the suit for $2.5 million.151 In February 2008, 
technology firm FARO settled a class-action securities fraud lawsuit 
brought by shareholders for $6.9 million in connection with payments 
made by the company in its Chinese operations.152 In another case, Las 
Vegas Sands shareholders filed a derivative lawsuit against various 
company officers in federal court alleging breach of fiduciary duty, 
abuse of control, waste of corporate assets, and conspiracy involving 
alleged improper bribes in violation of the FCPA.153 Conduct that 
violates the anti-bribery provisions may also give rise to a private cause 
of action for treble damages under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt 
Organization Act (RICO),154 or to actions under other federal or state 
laws. 
B. USE OF RELATED STATUTES 
The BAE Systems case (in which the company plead guilty to 
conspiracy and violations of the Arms Export Control Act and the 
FCPA) demonstrates that federal enforcement agencies sometimes rely 
on other statutes that are complementary to the FCPA.155 
Complementary statutes such as export control laws,156 false statement 
statutes,157 mail and wire fraud158 and money laundering laws159 may be 
employed in bringing bribery-related charges. In essence, the FCPA is 
not the only anti-corruption statute on which U.S. businesses should be 
focused. Indeed, complementary statutes also permit regulatory 
authorities to seek harsher penalties. 
                                                                                                                                         
 151. Sulavik, supra note 11, at 16. 
 152. Id. at 16. 
 153. Steve Green, Shareholders Sue Over Probes Facing Las Vegas Sands, LAS 
VEGAS SUN, Apr. 1, 2011, available at http://www.lasvegassun.com/news/2011/apr/01 
/shareholders-sue-over-probes-facing-las-vegas-sand/. 
 154. Maris & Singer, supra note 137, at 589; Sulavik, supra note 11, at 16. The text 
of RICO can be found at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (2006). 
 155. See supra text accompanying notes 1-3. 
 156. 15 C.F.R. §§ 730-774 (2009); 22 C.F.R. §§ 120-130 (2009). 
 157. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1001, 287, 1621, 1623. 
 158. Id. §§ 1341, 1343. 
 159. Id. §§ 1956, 1957. 
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C. ACCOUNTING AND INTERNAL CONTROL PROVISIONS 
1. Keep Accurate and Complete Books and Records 
Publicly traded firms are required to “make and keep books, 
records, and accounts which, in reasonable detail, accurately and fairly 
reflect the transactions and dispositions of the assets of the company.”160 
The recordkeeping provisions are intended to prevent three types of 
improprieties: (1) the failure to record illegal transactions; (2) the 
falsification of records to conceal illegal transactions; and (3) the 
creation of records that are quantitatively accurate but fail to specify 
qualitative aspects of the transaction.161 No materiality requirement 
applies with regard to making and keeping accurate financial records. 
Although the FCPA does not define “books, records, and 
accounts,” the statute applies to a wide variety of corporate records. For 
FCPA purposes, records include “accounts, correspondence, 
memorandums, tapes, disks, papers, books, and other documents or 
transcribed information of any type whether expressed in ordinary or 
machine language.”162 One federal court has observed that “virtually any 
tangible embodiment of information made or kept by an issuer is within 
the scope of [the accounting provisions].”163 Hence, not only internal 
corporate records, such as ledgers and journal entries, but also records of 
corporate transactions with third parties, such as agreements with third-
party vendors, are covered. The FCPA’s recordkeeping provision also 
includes minutes of board of director meetings and board resolutions, 
but would not encompass every memorandum or note taken by an 
employee relating to any business matter. 
Furthermore, transactions must be accurately recorded “in 
reasonable detail.” The FCPA defines “reasonable detail” to mean “such 
level of detail . . . as would satisfy prudent officials in the conduct of 
their own affairs.”164 This means that records should include any 
                                                                                                                                         
 160. 15 U.S.C. § 78M(b)(2)(A). 
 161. Maris & Singer, supra note 137, at 580; Deming, supra note 48, at 483-90; 
DONALD R. CRUVER, COMPLYING WITH THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 14-17 
(2d ed. 1999). 
 162. 15 U.S.C. § 78(c)(a)(37). 
 163. SEC v. World-Wide Coin Inv., Ltd., 567 F. Supp. 724, 748-49 (N.D. Ga. 
1983). 
 164. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(b)(2)(A) & (b)(7); SEC v. Battenberg, No. 06-14891, 2011 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88255, at *10 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 9, 2011). 
2012] TAKING A BITE OUT OF BRIBERY 575 
information tending to alert the SEC to any impropriety. For example, 
external and internal auditors should look for cash payments, payments 
to anonymous or numbered bank accounts, checks written to “bearer” or 
“cash” and misleading or fake documentation serving as a cover for 
fictitious sales, purchases, loans or other transactions. 
All public companies that file Form 10-K reports must observe the 
accounting provisions regardless of whether they engage in foreign 
operations.165 Officers, directors, employees and stockholders or agents 
of a publicly traded firm are also subject to the accounting provisions. 
Individuals and non-publicly traded entities can be subject to the 
accounting provisions to the extent they are accomplices to statutory 
violations. The accounting provisions apply to various types of 
corporate activities, even wholly domestic activities and the manner in 
which those activities or transactions are reflected in corporate 
accounting records.166 
A U.S. publicly traded firm (an “issuer”) must ensure that any 
majority-owned foreign subsidiary adheres to the accounting provisions. 
For example, in 2006, the SEC brought an action against Schnitzer Steel 
Industries, Inc.167 Allegedly, Schnitzer’s wholly owned subsidiaries, SSI 
International Far East Ltd. and SSI International, Inc., made improper 
cash payments to managers of scrap metal customers owned, in whole or 
in part, by the Chinese government, to induce purchases of Schnitzer’s 
scrap metal.168 “In order to conceal the improper payments, Schnitzer 
falsely described those payments to foreign officials as ‘sales 
commissions,’ ‘commissions to the customer,’ ‘refunds,’ or ‘rebates’ in 
Schnitzer’s books and records.”169 Schnitzer paid a $7.7 million civil 
penalty for violation of both the anti-bribery and accounting/internal 
control provisions of the FCPA.170  
                                                                                                                                         
 165. Said FCPA provisions are part of the federal securities laws which apply to all 
U.S. publicly traded firms (with or without foreign business activity). The accounting 
and internal control provisions have a broader reach than improper payments to foreign 
officials and apply to all aspects of practices relating to the preparation of financial 
statements of an entity. Maris & Singer, supra note 137, at 579; Deming, supra note 48, 
at 482; THOMAS LEE HAZEN, 2 LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION 348 (5th ed. 2005). 
See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(b)(2)(A), (b)(6). 
 166. See United States v. CropGrowers Corp., 954 F. Supp. 335, 356-57 (D.D.C. 
1997). 
 167. In re Schnitzer Steel Indus., Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 34-54606, at 1 
(Oct. 16, 2006), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2006/34-54606.pdf. 
 168. Id. at 2. 
 169. Id. at 3. 
 170. Id. at 4-8. 
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A parent issuer may also be held responsible in some cases of less 
than 50% ownership.171 When an issuer does not have an ownership 
interest greater than 50%, it must “proceed in good faith to use its 
influence, to the extent reasonable under the issuer’s circumstances, to 
cause [the affiliate] to devise and maintain a system of internal 
accounting controls” consistent with the accounting provisions.172 Good 
faith efforts should “include the relative degree of the issuer’s ownership 
of the domestic or foreign firm and the laws and practices governing the 
business operations of the country in which such firm is located.”173 
Other relevant factors in assessing good faith include the extent to which 
the issuer has the opportunity to obtain access to books and records, and 
the extent to which the issuer can influence a subsidiary’s or other 
partner’s actions by other means.174 The SEC applies practical tests in its 
determination of whether an issuer controls a foreign subsidiary. An 
issuer’s duty to influence a foreign subsidiary’s behavior increases 
directly with the degree to which it can exercise control over the 
subsidiary. 
2. Internal Controls 
The FCPA itself does not define “internal accounting controls.” In 
general, internal controls are the various policies, procedures, and 
processes by which a business is managed effectively and efficiently. 
One federal appellate court defined “internal accounting controls” as the 
“mechanism by which companies monitor their accounting system (their 
individualized method of processing transactions) for errors and 
irregularities in order to safeguard company assets and ensure that 
records are sufficiently reliable.”175 
The FCPA requires publicly traded firms to design and maintain a 
system of internal controls sufficient to provide reasonable assurances 
that: 
 
                                                                                                                                         
 171. See Deming, supra note 48, at 474. The SEC took enforcement action against 
an issuer that had less than 50% control in SEC v. BellSouth Corp., No. 1:02CV-0113 
(N.D. Ga. Jan. 15, 2002), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lr173 
10.htm. 
 172. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(6) (2006). 
 173. Id. 
 174. See Witten et al., supra note 93, at 701. 
 175. In re Ikon Office Solutions, Inc., 277 F.3d 658, 672 n.14 (3d Cir. 2002). 
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(i) transactions are executed in accordance with management’s 
general or specific authorization; (ii) transactions are recorded as 
necessary (I) to permit preparation of financial statements in 
conformity with generally accepted accounting principles or any 
other criteria applicable to such statements, and (II) to maintain 
accountability for assets; (iii) access to assets is permitted only in 
accordance with management’s general or specific authorization; 
and (iv) the recorded accountability for assets is compared with the 
existing assets at reasonable intervals and appropriate action is taken 
with respect to any differences . . . .176 
 
The SEC does not mandate any specific internal controls. The SEC 
articulates broad goals that controls should achieve and leaves the 
implementation of specific policies and procedures to issuers. Several 
factors are considered in the determination of whether a system of 
internal controls is reasonable under the circumstances: (1) the role of 
the board of directors; (2) communication of corporate procedures; (3) 
assignment of authority and responsibility; (4) competence and integrity 
of personnel; (5) accountability for performance and compliance with 
policies and procedures; and (6) objectivity and effectiveness of the 
internal audit function.177 The failure to establish an audit committee 
may violate the FCPA. A public firm may also violate the law if it has 
no controls for a particular activity such as fund transfers outside the 
country or the making of political contributions. 
3. Enforcement of Accounting and Internal Control Provisions 
Both the SEC and DOJ have enforced the FCPA’s accounting and 
recordkeeping provisions, with the SEC often taking the lead. In 
addition, the accounting provisions have been used to support charges 
under the anti-bribery provisions. Prosecution under the anti-bribery 
provisions is more difficult because evidence is obtained in a foreign 
setting.178 
In an anti-bribery case, one of the most difficult elements is tracing 
funds through offshore corporations and bank accounts, the beneficial 
ownership of which can be extremely costly to determine.179 The 
                                                                                                                                         
 176. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(B)(i)-(iv). 
 177. Maris & Singer, supra note 137, at 581. 
 178. Deming, supra note 48, at 492. 
 179. Suppose that to prove a case against a bribe-giver the U.S. must prove that 
payments to a certain Caribbean corporation secretly benefited the procurement 
minister in the foreign nation concerned. Proving the link between the minister and the 
company can be difficult and expensive. Philip Segal, Coming Clean on Dirty Dealing: 
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cooperation of authorities in foreign nations is vital. If law enforcement 
in a given country fails to cooperate then the U.S. government must 
prove the case here without subpoena and search powers where the bribe 
may have occurred.180 
For a FCPA case involving the accounting provisions, no need 
exists to prove “corrupt intent,” whether a “foreign official” was 
involved or to demonstrate whether a promise, offer or payment was 
made to “obtain or retain business” or “secure an improper 
advantage.”181 The elements of an accounting violation are limited to 
whether the business record is covered by the accounting provisions, 
whether the conduct was willful, and whether the record was accurate in 
reasonable detail.182 
For example, in July 2010, the SEC filed books and records, and 
internal controls charges against General Electric and two GE 
subsidiaries—Ionics, Inc. and Amersham PLC.183 The SEC alleged that 
the two subsidiaries made $3.6 million in illegal kickback payments to 
the Iraqi Health Ministry, that GE and the two subsidiaries failed to 
maintain adequate systems of internal controls to detect and prevent the 
payments and that the accounting for the transactions failed to properly 
record the nature of the payments.184 GE agreed to pay $23.4 million to 
settle the charges.185 
In another case, the SEC entered into a deferred prosecution 
agreement (“DPA”) with Tenaris S.A. concerning allegations that the 
steel pipe product manufacturer bribed Uzbekistan officials to supply oil 
and natural gas pipelines.186 In response to SEC findings, Tenaris 
reviewed its compliance practices.187 Generally, businesses can improve 
                                                                                                                                         
Time for a Fact-Based Evaluation of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 18 FLA. J. 
INT’L. L. 169, 187 (2006). 
 180. Id. 
 181. Deming, supra note 48, at 482, 492. 
 182. United States v. Wilson, No. 01 CR. 53 (DLC), 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9572, 
at *19 (S.D.N.Y. July 13, 2001). 
 183. SEC v. Gen. Elec. Co., Exchange Act Release, No. 3159, CA No. 1:10-CV-
01258 (D.D.C. July 27, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases 
/2010/lr21602.htm. 
 184. Id. 
 185. Id. 
 186. Tenaris to Pay $5.4 Million in SEC’s First-Ever Deferred Prosecution 
Agreement, SEC NEWS DIGEST, 1 (May 17, 2011), http://www.sec.gov/news/digest 
/2011/dig051711.htm. 
 187. Id. 
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their internal controls through due diligence requirements related to the 
retention and payment of agents and FCPA training. 
4. Vicarious Liability Under the Accounting and Internal Control 
Provisions 
a. Criminal Liability 
An individual or entity can be held vicariously liable for the 
conduct of a third party when the latter is acting for or on behalf of the 
individual. Even if a third party is not subject to the accounting and 
internal control provisions, an individual or entity may become subject 
to vicarious liability if that individual or entity directs, authorizes or 
ratifies prohibited conduct.188 The key determinant is whether the agent 
is acting within the scope of express, implied or apparent authority.189 
Improper entries in an entity’s books and records often result when 
improper payments are made or funneled to a foreign official through a 
foreign agent.190 A parent firm probably confronts an accounting/internal 
controls violation despite that an improper accounting entry is made on 
the books of a remote subsidiary or affiliate.191 Also, an 
accounting/internal controls charge may be pressed against a parent 
based on the notion that had appropriate internal controls been enforced 
any improper payment would not have happened.192 
For criminal liability to attach for the conduct of third parties, a 
publicly traded firm must possess knowledge that the third party has 
circumvented or intends to violate the accounting provisions. Deliberate 
                                                                                                                                         
 188. Deming, supra note 48, at 476. 
 189. United States v. Basic Constr. Co., 711 F.2d 570, 572 (4th Cir. 1983); see also 
United States v. Koppers Co., 652 F.2d 290, 298 (2d Cir. 1981). 
 190. Koehler, supra note 95, at 402. 
 191. Id. 
 192. Id. For example, Halliburton was held liable under the accounting and internal 
control provisions based on the conduct of agents used by a joint venture in which 
Halliburton participated indirectly through subsidiaries. Specifically, Halliburton was 
held liable based on the allegation that it exercised control over subsidiaries that were 
involved in the joint venture. The SEC complaint contended that: (1) Kellogg, Brown, 
and Root’s (“KBR”) board of directors consisted solely of senior Halliburton officials; 
(2) senior Halliburton officials hired and replaced KBR’s senior officials, set 
compensation and established performance goals; (3) Halliburton consolidated KBR’s 
financial statements; and (4) KBR’s Halliburton officials were aware of the joint 
venture’s use of a U.K. agent. Complaint at 30, SEC v. Halliburton Co., No. 4:09-399 
(S.D. Tex. Feb. 11, 2009). 
580 FORDHAM JOURNAL [Vol. XVII 
 OF CORPORATE & FINANCIAL LAW 
ignorance or conscious disregard can satisfy the knowledge 
requirement.193 Conscious acquiescence to an authorized act or acts may 
amount to authorization of those acts.194 Knowledge may reside with one 
person not necessarily a senior officer,195 or may be the collective 
knowledge of various employees acting within the scope of 
employment. 196 
Vicarious criminal liability can also emanate from an entity or 
individual being an accomplice under the aiding and abetting statute.197 
Criminal liability based on aiding and abetting requires intent that an 
offense be committed plus conduct that aids or abets a violation.198 Also, 
a conspiracy (i.e., an agreement) of two or more entities and/or 
individuals to violate the accounting and/or internal control provisions 
may serve as the basis for a federal conspiracy offense.199 The statute 
requires the commission of an overt act in furtherance of the 
conspiracy.200 The overt act need not be unlawful, so long as it 
contributes to an unlawful end. A relatively minor act, such as a phone 
call, or a series of e-mails, can serve as an overt act. The overt act is 
attributable to all co-conspirators who are members at the time the act is 
committed or those who join later.201 
Moreover, under the Pinkerton rule, a defendant may be vicariously 
liable for a substantive offense committed by another member of the 
                                                                                                                                         
 193. United States v. Picciandra, 788 F.2d 39, 46 (1st Cir. 1986); see also United 
States v. McAllister, 747 F.2d 1273, 1275 (9th Cir. 1984). 
 194. Brown, supra note 78, at 32-33. 
 195. United States v. Basic Constr. Co., 711 F.2d 570, 573 (4th Cir. 1982). 
 196. United States v. Bank of New England, 821 F.2d 844, 855-56 (1st Cir. 1987). 
 197. 18 U.S.C. § 2 (2006) (“Whoever willfully causes an act to be done which if 
directly performed by him or another would be an offense against the United States, is 
punishable as a principal.”). 
 198. United States v. Medina, 887 F.2d 528, 532 (5th Cir. 1989); see also United 
States v. Martin, 920 F.2d 345, 348 (6th Cir. 1990). 
 199. 18 U.S.C. § 371. This statute makes it a crime for “two or more persons to 
conspire either to commit any offense against the United States, or to defraud the 
United States, or any agency thereof in any manner or for any purpose . . . .” Id. 
 200. United States v. Quinn, 403 F. Supp. 2d 57, 67 (D.D.C. 2005). An overt act is 
an “outward act done in pursuance of the crime and in manifestation of an intent or 
design, looking toward the accomplishment of the crime.” Chavez v. United States, 275 
F.2d 813, 817 (9th Cir. 1960). 
 201. See Salinas v. United States, 522 U.S. 52, 63-64 (1997). 
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conspiracy.202 A co-conspirator may be convicted of an offense (other 
than conspiracy) without knowledge of or participation in the offense.203 
Pinkerton liability is not rare in white collar crime cases such as FCPA 
violations. 
b. Civil Liability 
A civil action under the accounting and internal control provisions 
does not require knowledge.204 An entity can be held strictly liable for 
the actions taken by an officer, director, employee, shareholder or agent 
acting on behalf of the issuer.205 When an issuer has an interest greater 
than 50%, strict liability applies.206 When an entity has less than a 50% 
interest, strict vicarious liability attaches when it is shown that the entity 
has not proceeded “in good faith to use its influence, to the extent 
reasonable under the . . . circumstances, to cause such domestic or 
foreign firm to devise and maintain a system of internal controls 
consistent” with those provisions.207 
Another theory of vicarious liability used by the SEC is “control 
person” liability under §20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.208 
This legal approach requires that the plaintiff establish a primary FCPA 
violation by the controlled person entity, as well as control of the 
primary violator.209 Control of a primary violator may be shown by 
ownership of voting securities, contract, ability to influence 
management policies or otherwise.210 Once a prima facie violation of 
                                                                                                                                         
 202. Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 645-48, 651 (1946). In that case, 
Daniel Pinkerton, the defendant, was convicted of tax fraud actually committed by his 
brother. Daniel was in jail at the time and did not participate in or even know of the 
offenses. Daniel’s liability was upheld on the theory that co-conspirators are 
responsible for each other’s acts. 
 203. See id. 
 204. See, e.g., In re Int’l. Bus. Machs. Corp., Securities Act Release No. 34-43761 
(Dec. 21, 2000), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/34-43761.htm; 
Witten et al., supra note 93, at 702; Deming, supra note 48, at 480. 
 205. See id. 
 206. Deming, supra note 48, at 480; Witten et al., supra note 93, at 701; Giudice, 
supra note 142, at 353. 
 207. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(6) (2006). 
 208. Id. § 78t(a); see, e.g., SEC v. First Jersey Secs., Inc., 101 F.3d 1450 (2d Cir. 
1996). 
 209. First Jersey Secs., Inc., 101 F.3d at 1472. 
 210. 17 C.F.R. § 240.12b-2 (2009). 
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§20(a) is established the burden of proof shifts to the control person or 
entity to demonstrate actions taken in good faith.211 
c. FCPA Penalties 
Criminal and civil penalties can result from violation of the FCPA. 
A company that violates the anti-bribery provisions may be fined up to 
$2 million per offense and be subject to civil penalties of $100,000 per 
violation.212 An individual may be fined up to $100,000 per violation 
and imprisoned for five years for a willful violation and may be subject 
to civil penalties of $10,000 per violation.213 Alternatively, fines can be 
levied up to $250,000 for an individual and $500,000 for a corporation, 
or twice the gross gain from unlawful activity, whichever is greater.214 
A company that knowingly commits a violation of the accounting 
provisions may be fined up to $25 million and face civil penalties of up 
to $500,000.215 An individual may be fined $5 million, imprisoned for 
20 years, and face up to $100,000 in civil penalties.216 Other penalties 
for accounting provision violations include SEC injunctive actions, civil 
penalty actions, equitable remedies, such as “disgorgement” of profits 
and administrative proceedings. 
XII. FCPA COMPLIANCE PROVISIONS 
The main reasons for a FCPA compliance program are to prevent 
violations prior to their occurrence, quickly detect any violations and 
mitigate the penalties in the event a violation occurs. The DOJ and SEC 
have indicated that the existence of a compliance program is a 
significant factor taken into account in deciding whether to bring 
charges, what charges to bring and what penalties to impose.217 The 
failure to establish a FCPA compliance program may be seen as 
                                                                                                                                         
 211. Marbury Mgmt. Inc. v. Kohn, 629 F.2d 705 (2d Cir. 1980). 
 212. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-2(g)(1), 78dd-3(e)(1), 78ff(c)(1)-(2) (2006). 
 213. Id. §§ 78dd-2(g)(2), 78dd-3(e)(2). 
 214. 18 U.S.C. § 3571. 
 215. Id. §§ 78u(d)(3)(B)(iii), 78ff(a). 
 216. Id. §§ 78ff(a). 
 217. Memorandum from Paul J. McNulty, Deputy Attorney General, to Heads of 
Department Components, United States Attorneys (Dec. 2006), available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/speeches/2006/mcnulty_memo.pdf. 
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evidence of a lack of internal controls that might in and of itself be a 
violation of the accounting provisions.218 
U.S. Federal Sentencing Guidelines and several FCPA settlement 
agreements outline criteria by which a compliance program is evaluated 
by the SEC and DOJ.219 Although these criteria are not legally binding, 
they provide solid guidance on the contents of an effective FCPA 
compliance program. These criteria include: 
 Clearly stated corporate policy against violations of the 
FCPA and establishment of compliance standards and 
procedures that are reasonably capable of diminishing the 
prospect of violations; 
 Assignment of the responsibility for compliance oversight 
to appropriate senior corporate officials who report directly 
to the audit or compliance committee of the Board of 
Directors; 
 Identification of high-risk countries or businesses and 
performance of periodic anti-bribery audits of operations in 
such countries; 
 Regular FCPA training for officers and employees 
involved in foreign projects and for agents, consultants, and 
subcontractors; 
 Adoption and implementation of accounting and internal 
controls to ensure compliance with the accounting and 
recordkeeping provisions of the FCPA; 
 Establishment of a reporting system for officers, 
employees, agents, consultants, joint venture partners, and 
distributors to report suspected criminal conduct without 
fear of reprisal; and 
 Adoption and implementation of procedures to ensure that 
the company’s agents, consultants, joint venture partners, 
                                                                                                                                         
 218. See Witten et al., supra note 93. 
 219. U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION, SUPPLEMENT TO 2010 GUIDELINES MANUAL § 
8B2.1 (2010); Plea Agreement, United States v. Titan Corp., No. 05CR0314, at 4-5 
(S.D. Cal. Mar. 1, 2005), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/ 
titan-corp/03-01-05titan-plea.pdf; Plea Agreement, United States v. DPC Tianjin Ltd., 
No. CR 05-482, at 4-5 (C.D. Cal. May 20, 2005), available at http://www.justice. 
gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/dpc-tianjin/5-19-05dpc-tianjin-plea-agree.pdf. 
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and distributors are not likely to engage in improper 
activities.220 
Conducting a due diligence investigation of agents, partners or 
consultants of a firm that could potentially violate the FCPA is one way 
to reduce the risk of FCPA violations. Company procedures should 
require that a due diligence process be undertaken before the firm enters 
into a relationship with a foreign agent, representative or business 
partner. FCPA due diligence concerning consultants, partners or agents 
should include requirements that the company:  
 
 determine the competence, expertise, and reputation of the 
party, as well as the party’s contacts with important 
government decision-makers. The party’s experience, 
education, former governmental or military service, family 
and business relationships, and reputation for honesty are 
all important areas of inquiry; 
 
 evaluate whether the proposed compensation to be paid in 
exchange for the services rendered or products delivered is 
reasonable. “Success fees” deserve special scrutiny; 
 
 contact local counsel to ensure that they proposed 
arrangement will not violate local law . . . and, depending 
on the circumstances, FCPA counsel; 
 
 insert standard representations and warranties concerning 
compliance with the FCPA; 
 
 assure the maintenance of accurate books and records by 
the consultant, [agent] or partner; 
 
 apply a common sense “smell” test to the proposed 
arrangement; and 
 
 after [due] diligence is completed, prepare a file 
memorandum to record the [due] diligence steps taken.221 
                                                                                                                                         
 220. Witten et al., supra note 93, at 724-26. 
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Different sources to help ascertain a consultant’s or agent’s 
reputation, expertise and relationships include auditing firms, law firms, 
the relevant U.S. Embassy, the Commerce Department, the State 
Department, financial institutions and possibly private investigations.222 
Companies using foreign consultants, agents, or representatives 
should place protective covenants in consultancy, partnership or agency 
agreements, such as: 
 
 The parties’ confirmation of an awareness of the terms of 
the FCPA; 
 
 An agreement not to violate the FCPA; 
 
 An agreement not to pay money or anything of value to 
foreign officials; 
 
 A representation that the party is not an employer, officer, 
or agent of a foreign government or candidate for public 
office, and an agreement that the U.S. party will be advised 
if the partner or consultant assumes the position of a 
government official during the relationship; 
 
 An agreement that the party will keep accurate books and 
records; 
 
 A covenant that will allow the U.S. firm to review or audit 
all the books and records of the consultant or agent relating 
to its activities for the benefit of the U.S. firm; and 
 An agreement that payments under any contract will be 
made only by check or wire transfer to an account in the 
name of the contracting party located in the host country.223 
 
All compliance efforts should be documented carefully to permit 
the U.S. firm to prove later that it implemented a rigorous program in 
practice. 
                                                                                                                                         
 221. O’MELVENY & MYERS LLP, FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT HANDBOOK 
(4th ed. 2003). 
 222. Id. 
 223. Id. at 12-13. 
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It is critical to have the appropriate “tone from the top” for FCPA 
compliance. The entity’s FCPA policies and procedures must be 
endorsed and sponsored by both senior and mid-level management. The 
latter are important because they actually conduct the firm’s daily 
business operations. Each entity should also conduct periodic reviews of 
its FCPA compliance program with a view toward remedial action so 
that any missteps are not repeated. Continuous monitoring for FCPA 
compliance should be linked to other anti-fraud efforts because a 
relationship exists between the way bribery is conducted and the types 
of schemes used for fraud.224 
CONCLUSION 
The FCPA now plays a pivotal role in addressing U.S. firms’ 
involvement in bribery of foreign public officials and requiring that 
publicly traded firms meet certain standards regarding internal controls 
and accounting practices, books and records. The SEC and DOJ have 
increased enforcement of the FCPA during the last few years to such an 
extent that many publicly traded firms have FCPA audits performed by 
internal and/or external auditors. 
The anti-bribery provisions criminalize the payment or offer of 
payment either directly or indirectly, of money or anything of value to 
an official of a foreign government, public international organization, 
foreign political party or candidate for public office, made with corrupt 
intent to obtain or retain business or secure an improper advantage. The 
anti-bribery provisions are much broader than the accounting provisions. 
All public companies that file Form 10-K reports must observe the 
accounting provisions regardless of whether they engage in foreign 
operations. Officers, directors, employees, and stockholders or agents of 
a public company, acting on the latter’s behalf, are subject to the 
accounting provisions. The latter are aimed at prohibiting the 
establishment of off-the-books accounts, making of off-the-books 
transactions, recording of non-existent expenditures and the use of false 
documentation for concealing bribery activities. 
The FCPA also requires publicly traded firms to design and 
maintain a system of internal controls. Although the SEC does not 
mandate any specific controls, it does articulate broad goals that controls 
should achieve while leaving the implementation of specific policies and 
                                                                                                                                         
 224. Taylor, supra note 10, at 23. 
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procedures to issuers. FCPA provisions related to internal controls 
provide many ways for the SEC to initiate legal proceedings. 
Serious criminal and civil sanctions can result from FCPA 
violations. During the last decade, numerous firms have paid fines and 
penalties totaling billions of dollars and individuals have been sentenced 
to prison. A firm’s cooperation is considered by the government in 
deciding whether to bring criminal charges and what penalties to seek. 
FCPA compliance programs are a key means to demonstrate 
cooperation in the event of a violation. A firm’s board of directors and 
senior management should establish a compliance culture through 
preventative training and ongoing monitoring. Specific audits focused 
on the FCPA have become more common in many firms. Also, in an 
acquisition setting, it is possible for an acquirer to be held liable if a 
seller’s FCPA violations are not uncovered. 
In sum, the FCPA and its enhanced enforcement represent an 
important step towards combating bribery in international business 
transactions and promoting more transparent financial reporting. 
Increased enforcement of the FCPA should result in a reduction of the 
level of corruption and fraud. Only then will the global marketplace 
become a level playing field that embraces the principles of fairness and 
transparency and promotes confidence in the arena in which 
international and securities transactions occur. 
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Table 1 – Page 1 of 2  
 SUMMARY DATA ON FCPA VIOLATIONS—2000-2009 
 
Year 2009 2008 2007 2006 2005      
Total number of cases filed 67 47 47 18 14      
    Number of cases against corporations 17 30 29 7 8      
              Of which are foreign corporations 1 17 6 3 1      
    Number of cases against Individuals 50 17 18 11 6      
Cases disposed 32 43 46 18 14      
Cases pending at end of year 35 4 1 0 0      
 
Cases Filed by SEC 
          
        Number of cases 15 15 21 11 5      
        Total value of SEC sanctions (in million $)a 209.489(13) 406.667(12) 86.351(18) 68.485(7) 35.095(5)      
        Average sanction (in million $) 
  
16.114 
   
33.889 
    
4.797 
    
9.783 
 
7.019 
     
         
        Total value of business obtained (in million $)a 
 
6037.370(7) 
 
10759.706(8) 
 
2608.965(13) 
 
945.719(8) 
 
151.010(3) 
     
        
        Average value of business obtained (in million $) 
 
862.481 
 
1344.963 
 
200.69 
 
118.215 
 
50.337 
     
        
        Total bribe paid (in million $)a 
 
    182.311(6) 
 
1616.148(13)
 
    86.095(18) 
 
14.381(11) 
 
    5.622(5) 
     
        Average bribe amount (in million $) 30.385 124.319 4.783 1.307 1.124      
        Average ratio of bribe to value of business   obtained 0.1478 0.2721 0.1935 0.0133 0.0213      
 
Cases Filed by DOJ 
          
        Number of cases 52 32 26 7 9      
        Total value of DOJ sanctions (in million $)a 438.908(11) 508.889(16)     91.132(18)     8.284(6)  17.458(7)      
        Average sanction (in million $) 
   
39.901 
 
31.805 
 
5.063 
 
3.047 
 
2.4941 
    
 
        Total value of business obtained (in million $)a 
 
6542.504(29) 
 
9582.188(21) 
 
5816.416(17) 
 
751.590(5) 
 
112.055(3) 
     
         
        Average value of business obtained (in million $) 
 
225.604 
 
456.295 
 
342.142 
 
150.318 
 
37.352 
     
         
        Total bribe paid (in million $)a 
 
  217.280(26) 
 
1168.823(25) 
 
  383.168(20) 
 
  20.200(7) 
 
914.462(9) 
     
          
        Average bribe amount (in million $)  
 
8.357 
 
46.753 
 
19.158 
 
2.886 
 
101.607 
     
         
        Average ratio of bribe to value of business obtained  
 
0.1359 
 
0.2222 
 
0.1077 
 
0.0462 
 
0.0296 
     
 
Note: a Figures in parentheses indicate the number of cases for which data was available. NA – data not available        
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Table 1 – Page 2 of 2 
 SUMMARY DATA ON FCPA VIOLATIONS—2000-2009 
 
Year 2004 2003 2002 2001 2000      
Total number of cases filed 8 6 9 15 1      
    Number of cases against corporations 6 0 3 4 1      
              Of which are foreign corporations 3 0 1 0 0      
    Number of cases against Individuals 2 6 6 11 0      
Cases disposed 8 5 7 15 1      
Cases pending at end of year 0 1 2 0 0      
 
Cases Filed by SEC 
          
        Number of cases 3 1 5 7 1      
        Total value of SEC sanctions (in million $)a 16.426(2)                NA    .661(3)      0.175(2)    NA      
        Average sanction (in million $) 
 
8.213 
   
               NA    
 
0.22 
 
0.087 
            NA         
         
        Total value of business obtained (in million $)a 
 
           NA  
 
               NA 
 
          NA 
    
     6.457(3) 
 
NA 
     
        
        Average value of business obtained (in million $) 
  
           NA 
  
               NA 
 
          NA  
    
2.152 
 
NA 
     
        
        Total bribe paid (in million $)a 
 
    0.186(2) 
 
               NA 
 
11.960(3) 
    
     0.669(7) 
 
NA 
     
        Average bribe amount (in million $)            NA               NA 3.987 0.0956 NA       
        Average ratio of bribe to value of business   obtained            NA               NA           NA 0.1504 NA      
 
Cases Filed by DOJ 
          
        Number of cases 5 5 4 8 0      
        Total value of DOJ sanctions (in million $)a  6.0518(2)                 NA      2.406(3)      0.063(3)  NA         
        Average sanction (in million $) 
 
3.025 
   
                NA    
 
0.802 
 
0.021       NA    
    
 
        Total value of business obtained (in million $)a 
 
450.300(4) 
 
1101.000(2) 
 
2.270(3) 
    
   9.0975(4) 
 
NA 
     
         
        Average value of business obtained (in million $) 
 
112.575 
  
               NA 
 
0.756 
 
2.275 
 
NA 
     
         
        Total bribe paid (in million $)a 
 
    2.604(4) 
 
1011.000(5) 
 
0.757(4) 
 
     1.595(4) 
 
NA  
     
          
        Average bribe amount (in million $)  
 
0.651 
 
202.2 
 
0.189 
 
0.399 
 
NA  
     
         
        Average ratio of bribe to value of business obtained  
 
0.0101 
  
                NA 
 
0.131 
 
0.2896 
 
NA 
     
 
Note: a Figures in parentheses indicate the number of cases for which data was available. NA – data not available        
 
 
 
 
     
     
     
     
     
     
 
     
     
